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Introduction
This issue of the Medical Law Review contains six papers which were originally presented at a workshop held at Keele University in February 2001. 1 The event brought together lawyers and philosophers to discuss Re A (children) (conjoined twins), a case which had gripped the popular imagination and dominated the news media for the previous months. 2 The facts of Re A are so well-known that they need only the briefest rehearsal here. Conjoined twin baby girls, known as Jodie and Mary for the purposes of the court case, were born at St Mary's Hospital, Manchester, in August 2000. Their Maltese parents, the Attards, had travelled to Manchester from their home in Gozo to receive specialist medical treatment for their babies, after learning that Mrs Attard was carrying conjoined twins. Mary and Jodie were ischiopagus 1 conjoined twins. The lower ends of their spines and spinal cords were fused, and they shared a bladder and a common aorta. The heart and lungs located within the smaller and weaker twin (Mary) did not function and her supply of blood was pumped by the heart of her larger sibling (Jodie). Mary had a number of other medical problems including a poorly developed 'primitive' brain and abnormal neurological responses.
It was agreed that if the twins were not separated then there were only two possible outcomes. Either Jodie's heart and lungs would be gradually damaged by the strain of providing a blood supply for two bodies, her heart would fail and the twins would die (within a time-span estimated to be between six months and two years) or, alternatively, Mary might die in which case it would be necessary to perform an emergency separation procedure to save Jodie. Emergency separation would have a far smaller chance of success for Jodie (estimated at 60% risk of mortality) than would an earlier, elective separation (estimated at 6% risk of mortality 
Neither of the contrasting views of 'personhood' adopted by Harris and by
Watt was open to the courts which were restricted by the well established principle of English law that a legal person is created at the moment when she is born alive. 15 As such, it is not surprising that whilst the lawyers included in this collection are equally concerned with the courts' reasoning in Re A, their points of attack are rather different. In her paper, Jenny McEwan advances an important practical concern: the state of the law of murder following Re A. Whilst the Court Ward LJ states at 1018, 'Lest it be thought that this decision could become authority for wider propositions, such as that a doctor, once he has determined that a patient cannot survive, can kill the patient, it is important to restate the unique circumstances for which this case is authority. They are that it must be impossible to preserve the life of X, without bringing about the death of Y, that Y by his or her very continued existence will inevitably bring about the death of X within a short period of time, and that X is capable of living an independent life but Y is incapable under any circumstances (including all forms of medical intervention) of viable independent existence.' 17 On this point, see also Munro op. cit. n. 8.
